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I. INTRODUCTION 
The general intent of any program of reparations for a grievous 
injustice should be threefold: acknowledgment, redress (restitution1 or 
atonement2), and closure.3  Acknowledgment involves recognition and 
admission of the wrong by the perpetrators and/or beneficiaries of the 
wrong.4  In the case of blacks, this would mean the receipt of a formal 
apology and a commitment for redress on the part of the American 
community as a whole.5  Restitution means restoration of the victims to 
their condition prior to the injustice or to a condition they might have 
attained had the injustice not taken place.6  Again, in the case of blacks, 
this would mean the adoption of a national program that would eliminate 
racial disparities in wealth, income, education, health, political 
participation, and future opportunity to engage in American social life.7 
 Atonement, an alternative form of redress, involves perpetrators 
and/or beneficiaries meeting whatever conditions of forgiveness are 
acceptable to the victims.8  Substantively these conditions will be the 
product of good faith negotiations between those wronged and the 
wrongdoers.  These conditions could be identical with the requirements 
for restitution or could meet a weaker standard of compensation. 
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Finally, closure means that, subject to an efficacious policy of 
redress—whether the agreed upon norm is restitution or atonement—the 
book is shut on further compensation for the particular injustice in 
question.9  The victim population will not seek further redress for that 
injustice.  Once more, in the specific case of black Americans, closure 
would mean no further compensation would be sought for slavery, Jim 
Crow, or ongoing discrimination after an effective program of 
reparations has been implemented.10 
Indeed, typically the grievous injustice that is identified with a black 
reparations claim is the practice of slavery in the United States.  It is 
reasonable to argue that Jim Crow—or legal American segregation—and 
persistent discrimination are at least equally compelling bases for a 
reparations claim, but virtually all of the debate and controversy over 
reparations has focused on the claim associated with black enslavement 
in America.  Of course, neither those persons directly subjected to 
slavery nor their enslavers are living today, and opponents of reparations 
are prompt to charge that there is no evidence that the deprivations that 
confront today’s black population bear any significant connection to 
slavery. 
 For example, David Horowitz has asserted that “[n]o scientific 
attempt has been made to prove that living individuals have been 
adversely affected by a slave system that was ended nearly 150 years 
ago.”11  Similarly, journalist Juan Williams has observed: 
The devastation that slavery visited on black people is beyond debate, 
and so is the history of exploitation of former slaves once they were set 
free without compensation for their labor. 
 But that sound argument is now being contorted into claims that 
black America is still feeling the impact of slavery.  That stretch is 
necessary for the lawyers behind the reparations movement to support 
the idea that there are victims of slavery alive to serve as plaintiffs in a 
lawsuit.12 
 Indeed, Horowitz and Williams seem to echo each other’s anti-
reparations two-step in tandem.  Horowitz says plainly that the ex-slaves 
should have been compensated for their enslavement, but, sad to say, 
they were not.  And the failure to compensate them is no justification for 
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the provision of compensation for their longer term descendants.  In a 
remarkable passage, Horowitz declares that the grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, and beyond are simply out of luck for reparations because 
they were born too late to have been enslaved themselves: 
I fully support reparations for former slaves and their children.  
Unfortunately they are no longer with us.  Even though no payment can 
make up for the injury of slavery, American slaves should have been 
compensated when they were freed.  Instead, they were even denied the 
forty acres and a mule they had been promised.  This was a betrayal, as 
were the years of segregation and discrimination that followed. 
 But the injury of slavery is far in the past.  The reparations claim has 
to be assessed as a political proposal, in terms of its practical impact 
now. . . .  Anyone should be able to see that the reparations claim is 
really a prescription for racial division and ethnic strife.13 
Underlying this position that the past does not go far in explaining 
present racial disparities is a perspective that can be called post-racial 
optimism—a perspective that says that America has transcended or is 
making rapid progress toward transcending race consciousness and 
racism.  As a result, observed gaps between blacks and non-blacks are 
best explained by the retention of self-defeating behavioral practices on 
the part of blacks.  Ironically, to the extent that those practices are treated 
as a cultural holdover from slavery transmitted across generations—an 
argument especially popular among some black social workers—it is 
possible to make precisely the case that Horowitz and Williams both say 
is missing: that black America is still haunted and crippled by slavery.14 
 While the post traumatic slavery syndrome/disorder (PTSS/D) 
hypothesis does constitute an answer to Horowitz and Williams’s 
contention that no scientific attempt has been made to connect slavery to 
contemporary racial ills in America, it is not necessarily a hypothesis that 
points toward reparations, certainly not reparations that must involve a 
dramatic racial redistribution of wealth or material resources.  If blacks 
collectively are beset by PTSS/D, then what is needed is a massive 
program of psychotherapy to overcome the lingering cultural specter of 
slavery.  This might even be conducted via black self-help initiatives led 
by blacks who are role models for success or black community 
institutions like the church. 
                                                          
 13. HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 39. 
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 Essentially PTSS/D is an argument predicated on cultural 
determinism and rife with all the weaknesses intrinsic to such an 
approach.  A superior approach to understanding persistent racial 
disparities will be outlined below; an approach that also provides a 
response to Horowitz’s charge that there has been no scientific attempt to 
establish that there is an enduring legacy of slavery that restricts the 
quality of black life in America. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The popularity of cultural determinism in analyzing differences in 
economic outcomes is pervasive.  In the 1920s, economists sought an 
explanation for the evidence indicating that American industry was 
substantially more productive than British industry.  One popular answer 
was the presence of a fundamental difference in the cultural orientation 
of American and British industrialists, leading the former to be superior 
managers who “study . . . [American industrial] problems more 
intelligently and plan more courageously and more wisely.”15  Allyn 
Young was skeptical, though, pointing out that “[t]hose who hold that . . . 
can cite no facts in support of their opinion save the differences in the 
results achieved,” and further, “I know of no facts which prove or even 
indicate that British industry, seen against the background of its own 
problems and its own possibilities, is less efficiently organized or less 
ably directed than American industry or the industry of any other 
country.”16  Thus, Young rejected the view that the performance of 
British industrialists could be ranked as superior or inferior independent 
of the context of the conditions that confronted them during that period 
of time.17 
 In the mid-1970s, in examining the problem of slow economic 
growth and economic backwardness across the African continent, the 
economist Peter Bauer argued vehemently that the source of the lag was 
African culture.18  Observing that Sub-Saharan Africa never invented the 
wheel, he proposed that African cultural norms were predisposed toward 
the creation of institutions that are inimical to growth.19  Bauer, in a 
manner similar to the proponents of the cultural deficits of British 
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industrialists, provided no systematic evidence “in support of [his] 
opinion [than] the differences in the results achieved.”20  Subsequently, 
Gregory Price undertook a wide-ranging investigation of the 
phenomenon of slow African growth and found that it could be 
understood without any reference to cultural gaps.21  Instead, historical 
factors linked to exposure to colonialism in conjunction with the 
geography of the disease environment emerged as critical in the Price 
investigation.22 
 Recently, a Centers for Disease Control study indicated that risk-
taking behavior among teenagers is on the decline, although it remains 
significantly higher among Latino youths.  USA Today reports: 
 Hispanics drank alcohol at school at more than twice the rate of 
black or white students.  They also more often skipped school because 
they felt unsafe; they were more likely to use cocaine, Ecstasy, or 
heroin; and they were more likely to have been offered or sold an 
illegal drug on school property.23 
One can only wait for the moment when the slower decline in such risk-
taking behavior among Latino teens is attributed to some deficient aspect 
of Latino culture. 
Similarly, it is customary for the relatively high incidence of poverty, 
unemployment, incarceration, and lower economic and social well-being 
among blacks to be viewed as culturally driven.  Black Americans 
frequently are characterized as disproportionately engaging in a set of 
collectively dysfunctional behaviors.  These arguments enter the public 
discourse in multiple guises.  They include comedian Bill Cosby’s focus 
on “internal problems” in the black community, the perspectives 
advanced by such mavens of the Manhattan Institute as John McWhorter 
and June O’Neill, in former President Bill Clinton’s 1993 speech to a 
group of black ministers, and in then-presidential candidate Barack 
Obama’s numerous perorations on black Americans’ need to overcome 
the “psychology of victimization,” to take “personal responsibility,” and 
to transcend an obsession with racial particularism.  Economists as wide-
ranging ideologically as George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton, Glenn 
Loury, David Austen-Smith and Roland Fryer, Tom Sowell, Walter 
                                                          
 20. Id. 
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Williams, and Barry Chiswick also have embraced variants of cultural 
determinism to explain racial inequality in the United States.24  In short, 
black-white disparities are due to human capital disparities, and black 
cultural practices are the source of the human capital gap. 
In this image of the world in which we live, culture appears as 
something relatively fixed and portable.  Once cultural norms are 
established, groups carry predilections for particular behaviors with them 
from place to place.  Group A’s behaviors may be conducive to success 
in some settings while group B’s behaviors may be maladjusted.  
However the behaviors initially developed in association with a specific 
ethnic/racial group, their compatibility or incompatibility with group 
level efficacy is demonstrated by the relative outcomes achieved by 
members of the group. 
Intrinsically, this vision carries with it the spirit of post-racial 
optimism.  Although group-based behaviors may have a certain rigidity, 
they are not seen as poured in concrete.  Dysfunctional practices may be 
altered subject to group level recognition of the problem and the 
development of group-based remedies.  A group with a low profile of 
achievement does not have to persuade members of the dominant group 
to embrace policies to repair the out-group that may impose costs on the 
dominant group.  Everything ultimately can be solved internally with the 
right amount of spit and polish.  In short, if young black men just could 
be persuaded to pull their pants up they would be all right. 
Indeed, the post-racial optimists typically argue that so much 
progress has been made since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
that virtually all racial disparity in the United States is a residual caused 
by internal deficiencies among black Americans.25  A surprising fellow 
traveler camping with the post-racial optimists lately is Washington Post 
columnist Eugene Robinson.  In an April 2008 article, Robinson can be 
found complaining about the pessimists: 
[W]e sometimes talk about race in America as if nothing had changed.  
The truth is that everything has changed—mostly for the better—and 
that if we’re ever going to see [Martin Luther King Jr’s] dream 
fulfilled, first we have to acknowledge that this is not an America he 
would have recognized.26 
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Of course, many things have changed; inevitably the world of 2008 
cannot be the same as the world of 1968 when King was assassinated.  
But have things changed dramatically for the better? 
Robinson offers the following data as evidence for his racial 
optimism: (1) the black poverty rate has declined from 40% in 1968 to 
25% in 2008, (2) blacks possess $800 billion in purchasing power and 
would be the 15th or 16th richest country in the world as a sovereign 
nation, and (3) in 1968, 2% of black households earned $100,000 or 
more in current dollars; today, 10% have crossed that earnings 
threshold.27 
A major difficulty with Robinson’s argument is that his analysis is 
predicated on absolute rather than relative status.  Poverty rates have 
fallen for all groups in the United States, but the black poverty rate was 
three times as high as the white poverty rate in 1968—and still is today.28  
In addition, black Americans are not a sovereign state, nor are blacks 
able to independently generate $800 billion in income and form a 
separate country.  There is, after all, negligible black controlled 
productive capacity.  The major black-owned businesses are primarily 
retailers and service providers.29  In 2007, the top 200 black-owned firms 
identified by Black Enterprise (100 leading autodealers and 100 leading 
industrial service dealers collectively) grossed $27 billion.30  Firms 
ranking in the fifties and sixties on the Fortune 500 list—like Delphi, 
Prudential, Merrill Lynch, Du Pont, Walt Disney, Motorola, and Pepsi—
each grossed at least as much in 2004.31  The top firm, Wal-Mart stores, 
grossed $258 billion, almost ten times the amount of all of the top 200 
black-owned firms combined, and more than one-fourth of black 
America’s entire purchasing power.32  Similarly, Exxon Mobil grossed 
$213 billion, and General Motors grossed $195 billion.33 
Furthermore, in 1968, when 2% of black households earned at least 
$100,000 in 2008 dollars,34 more than twice the share of white 
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households did so (5%).35  By 2008, when 10% of black households 
earned $100,000 or more,36 22% of white households did so37—again 
more than twice the share.  Black median household income remains at 
about 60% of the white median, just as it was in 1968, and black per 
capita income as a proportion of white per capita income remains largely 
unchanged from 1880.38  Clearly a different perspective is needed from 
the culture-as-destiny view of the sources of inequality. 
III. STRATIFICATION ECONOMICS IN THE REPARATIONS DEBATE 
An alternative perspective that is context driven rather than culturally 
driven—the perspective of stratification economics—will be advanced 
here.  It will be applied to five topics to make plain the difference in 
implications between a context driven and a culturally driven analysis.  
The five topics are: (1) Latino versus U.S. treatment of race; (2) the 
American immigrant narrative; (3) racial wealth inequality (here is where 
we will find a “scientific” basis for the roots of contemporary black 
inequality in slavery); (4) racial/ethnic disparities in self-employment 
rates; and (5) the burden of “acting white.” 
Stratification economics is a new subfield in economics that 
integrates the emphasis on the salience of the group position and status 
from sociology and the drive for action motivated primarily out of 
material self-interest from economics.39  Thus, the stratification 
economist sees a world of self-interested “tribes” engaged in a persistent 
dance of negotiation and conflict, where conflict often includes acts of 
dehumanization and repression by the dominant group.40 
Group-based cultural patterns are understood instead primarily as 
responses to context and do not change gradually, but are expected to 
change sharply with major alterations in the conditions facing large 
numbers of members of the group in question.41  Rather than maladaptive 
                                                          
 35. U.S. Census Bureau, The 2009 Statistical Abstract: Income, Expenditures, Poverty, and 
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 40. See id. (noting that “discriminatory practices to preserve privilege are likely to persist rather 
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 41. See generally James B. Stewart, Economics, Stratification, in 2 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 530, 530–31 (William A. Darity, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008) 
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behaviors signaling group level dysfunctionality, such behaviors signal 
defects and injustices in the social structure.42  Even group level 
identification is an interdependent product of social context.  As James 
Stewart observes: 
Within stratification economics, special attention is directed to the role 
of racial and caste distinctions and similar group affiliations in 
producing and perpetuating income and wealth inequality.  Group 
identities are treated as produced forms of individual and collective 
property with both income and wealth-generating characteristics and 
whose supply and demand are responsive to changes in production 
costs and budget constraints.  Cooperative economic and noneconomic 
behaviors are treated as normal outcomes of individuals’ propensity to 
engage in own-group altruism and other-group antagonism.  
Stratification economists argue, for example, that intergroup conflict in 
both economic and noneconomic settings is an endogenous 
characteristic of the social space rather than an exogenous contaminant 
of market allocation processes and individual decision making.  These 
models predict that reductions in intergroup income and wealth 
differentials will not automatically lead to the erosion of traditional 
patterns of collective identification as long as investment in group 
identity generate unequal returns for different identities and also that 
movement toward more egalitarian intergroup distributions of wealth 
must be a major element in any earnest attempt to reduce intergroup 
conflict because inequities are institutionalized through processes that 
enable the transfer of material resources across generations.43 
Thus, stratification economics constitutes a mode of analysis closely 
aligned with the Blumer side of the Allport-Blumer debate over 
prejudice.44  While Allport treated prejudice as largely a problem of the 
individual, akin to a mental illness or a psychosis, and potentially curable 
via appropriately structured contacts with the “other,”45 Blumer rejected 
the notion that race prejudice “exists fundamentally as a feeling or set of 
feelings lodged in the individual.”46  Instead, he proposed that 
understanding prejudice necessitates “concern with the relationship of 
racial groups . . . [and] the collective process by which a racial group 
                                                          
 42. See id. (describing claims of group defectiveness as “an ideological mask that absolves the 
social system and privileged groups from criticism for their role in perpetrating” inequality). 
 43. James B. Stewart, Africana Studies and Economics: In Search of a New Progressive 
Partnership, 38 J. BLACK STUD. 795, 802–03 (2008) (citations omitted). 
 44. See also H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC CONFLICT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT 
HYPOTHESIS 201 (1997) (noting Blumer rejects Allport’s individualism basis for prejudice). 
 45. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 510–14 (25th Anniversary ed., 1979). 
 46. Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice As a Sense of Group Position, 1 PAC. SOC. REV. 3, 3 
(1958). 
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comes to define and redefine another racial group.”47  While Blumer’s 
rhetoric was specific to race prejudice, it is also applicable to the 
foundations of caste, phenotypical, ethnic, or gender distinction; it is 
applicable to any condition where relative position and group 
membership matter.48 
For Blumer, racial feelings were best understood as a matter of the 
“positional arrangements of the racial groups.”49  Thus, he shifted the 
terrain from individual attitudes and beliefs to group ideology.  Further, 
he argued that “four basic types of feeling . . . seem to be always present 
in race prejudice in the dominant group.”50  They include “(1) a feeling 
of superiority, (2) a feeling that the subordinate race is intrinsically 
different and alien, (3) a feeling of proprietary claim to certain areas of 
privilege and advantage, and (4) a fear and suspicion that the subordinate 
race harbors designs on the prerogatives of the dominant race.”51 
The feeling of superiority encompassed “self-assured” beliefs that 
the subordinate racial group is lazy, dishonest, greedy, unreliable, stupid, 
deceitful, or immoral.52  Perhaps one could say the subordinate group is 
culturally (or even genetically) dysfunctional; thus, the entire perspective 
of the cultural determinists is one of the four aspects of Blumer’s 
construction of race prejudice.  The feeling of intrinsic difference 
constructed the subordinate group as “an alien and fundamentally 
different stock.”53  Again, a biogenetic or cultural boundary separates 
“us” from “them.”  The feeling of proprietary claim is perhaps the most 
important from the viewpoint of stratification economics.  Here, Blumer 
included: 
[P]roperty such as choice lands and sites; the right to certain jobs, 
occupations or professions; the claim to certain kinds of industry or 
lines of business; the claim to certain positions of control and decision-
making as in government and law; the right to exclusive membership in 
[some institutions]; the claim to certain positions of social prestige and  
 
                                                          
 47. Id. 
 48. See generally Rae Lesser Blumberg, A General Theory of Gender Stratification, 2 SOC. 
THEORY 23 (1984); Stephanie Seguino, All Types of Inequality Are Not Created Equal: Divergent 
Impacts of Inequality on Economic Growth (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 433, 
2005). 
 49. Blumer, supra note 46, at 4. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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to the display of the symbols and accoutrements of these positions; and 
the claim to certain areas of intimacy and privacy.54 
Finally, for Blumer, race prejudice crystallized with the fourth type 
of group feeling.55  Here he emphasized the fear held by the dominant 
group that the subordinate group threatens their position of privilege.  
The dominant group will resist the subordinate group “‘getting out of 
[their] place.’”56 
Race prejudice or racism is functional.  It is not a mere deadweight 
loss for all members of a community.  It promotes a set of structured, 
cumulative advantages for certain socially marked groups and structured, 
cumulative disadvantages for others.  It is a cornerstone of group-based 
inequality—not “biology,” not “culture,” and not “nature.”  It is this 
perspective—the perspective of stratification economics—that informs 
the five topics analyzed below. 
First, there is a long-standing inclination to claim that there are 
profound cultural differences between Latin American and U.S. 
American notions of race.  This is perhaps somewhat odd, since the 
racial demographic history of both regions were shaped powerfully by 
the Atlantic slave trade and slavery.  One might expect that, under those 
circumstances, the very idea of race should bear some strong similarities.  
But the standard claim is that in Latin America—and among Latinos 
throughout the Americas—race is understood primarily as a matter of 
phenotype or appearance, while in the United States race is understood 
primarily as a matter of genotype or lineage (hence, the so-called “one 
drop rule”).  In concert, racial difference presumably is viewed as much 
less of a matter of stigmatization and, instead, as mere amusement in 
Latin America. 
The difficulty with this formulation is the evidence that genotype 
matters in Latin America and phenotype matters in the United States in 
the construction of racial distinctions.  Ethnographic research 
demonstrates that white-looking Latinos will hide evidence that they 
have dark-skinned relatives.57  If only their own appearance mattered, 
then they would feel no need to do so.  Moreover, the extent of white 
identification among Latinos who are darker-skinned is startling.  Even 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., FRANCE WINDDANCE TWINE, RACISM IN A RACIAL DEMOCRACY: THE 
MAINTENANCE OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN BRAZIL 87–109 (1998). 
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on surveys where responses can be given to an open-ended race question, 
a significant portion of darker-skinned Latinos will report their race as 
white, often forgoing black or a host of intermediate categories between 
black and white.58  Genotype matters, and blackness is penalized in Latin 
America. 
Phenotype has powerful effects in the United States.  There is strong 
evidence of employment discrimination both in terms of job access and 
wages for darker-skinned black men,59 and compelling evidence is 
emerging of marital discrimination against darker-skinned black women.  
Joni Hersch’s study using the New Immigrant Survey finds that shorter 
and darker-skinned immigrants are subjected to greater levels of 
discrimination in the labor market.60  Catherine Eckel’s laboratory 
experiments demonstrate that darker-skinned individuals generally are 
perceived as less trustworthy when judged independently of any 
additional information other than how they look.61  And Jennifer 
Eberhardt and her research team have demonstrated that blacker-looking 
men convicted of a capital crime are more likely to receive the death 
penalty than less-black-looking men convicted of the same type of 
crime.62  Phenotype matters, and blackness is penalized in the United 
States. 
Thus, two regions with similar histories of the process of racial 
formation are not as culturally distinct in terms of their conceptions of 
race as the conventional wisdom would have it. 
Next consider the classic immigrant narrative of upward mobility: 
new immigrants arrive in the United States and climb the urban escalator 
from poverty to middle-class status.  Ostensibly this happens over and 
over again, even if the immigrants are black West Indians or recent black 
immigrants from the African continent.  Why, then, do some groups not 
display the same degree of economic success, e.g., native black 
Americans?  Don’t the differences in outcomes have to be explained by 
different cultural orientations toward work, education, and achievement? 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., William A. Darity Jr. et al., Bleach in the Rainbow: Latin Ethnicity and 
Preference for Whiteness, 13 TRANSFORMING ANTHROPOLOGY 103, 104–05 (2005). 
 59. Arthur H. Goldsmith et al., From Dark to Light: Skin Color and Wages Among African-
Americans, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 701, 710–12 (2007). 
 60. Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color and Height, 
26 J. LAB. ECON. 345, 375 (2008). 
 61. Catherine C. Eckel, People Playing Games: The Human Face of Experimental Economics, 
73 SO. ECON. J. 841, 854 (2007). 
 62. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERS. 
& SOC. PSYCH. 876, 889–91 (2004) (demonstrating a strong correlation between perceptions of black 
people and thoughts about crime). 
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The stratification economist would look to the effects of selectivity 
and recognize from the outset that immigrant populations, particularly 
voluntary immigrant populations, are intrinsically different from 
populations of non-movers.  The example of the successful Japanese 
American population is highly instructive; this is the community given 
the seemingly laudatory, but actually pejorative, label of “model 
minority.” 
Masao Suzuki’s research reveals that three tiers of selectivity 
contributed to Japanese American economic ascension.63  First, the initial 
immigrants were selected upon entry into the United States in part by 
Japanese government screening.  This was a highly literate population at 
a time when the Japanese population generally was not.  It was also a 
population with a high level of experience in farm ownership and 
management.  Second, there was selectivity in return migration that 
heavily favored a return to Japan of those who had been the least 
successful in the United States.  Finally, there was selectivity in family 
formation.  Those men who had been the most successful in the United 
States were the most likely to import wives from Japan and form 
families.  Thus, the first generation of Japanese children born in the 
United States was likely to come disproportionately from middle class 
families. 
Suzanne Model’s new book on West Indian immigrants to the United 
States tells roughly the same story of immigrant selectivity coupled with 
some evidence of white favoritism toward West Indian over native black 
Americans.64  For males in particular, labor market outcomes are 
increasingly similar between West Indian and non-West Indian black 
males.65  And, in fact, the best available evidence indicates that, overall, 
immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa do not have superior labor-market 
outcomes to those of native black Americans, but they do not enter the 
United States with markedly superior resources than black Americans.66 
The net conclusion provides support for a lateral mobility 
proposition—the reproduction of their relative status in their country of 
origin by immigrants in the United States—rather than upward 
mobility.67 
                                                          
 63. Masao Suzuki, Selective Immigration and Ethnic Economic Achievement: Japanese 
Americans Before World War II, 39 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 254, 273–76 (2002). 
 64. See generally SUZANNE MODEL, WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANTS: A BLACK SUCCESS STORY? 
(2008). 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 110−14. 
 67. Darity, supra note 58, at 109. 
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The third topic is wealth inequality.  The black-white wealth gap is 
staggering.  Black households possessed seven percent of the net worth 
of white households at the median in 2002.68  The standard explanation 
from a culture driven perspective is to attribute this condition to a low 
rate of time preference on the part of blacks leading to lower savings 
rates and/or black ignorance about portfolio management.  The problem 
with the black profligacy and black stupidity claims is their inconsistency 
with the evidence that, after controlling for income, there are neither 
significant differences in black and white savings rates nor significant 
differences in rates of return earned on portfolios.69 
The stratification economist would turn instead to patterns of 
intergenerational transmission of wealth to understand the disparities in 
net worth.  The combination of inheritances and in vivo transfers would 
be the critical objects of attention for the stratification economist, not the 
savings and portfolio management practices of the group that is wealth-
poor.  The key question would become the historical reasons why one 
group has such great material resources to pass on to the next generation 
and why another has so little, rather than current savings behavior. 
The fundamental source of the gap is differential access to 
inheritances and in vivo transfers.  Racial differences in intergenerational 
transfers of assets are key to understanding gross inequality between 
blacks and whites in net worth.  Most wealth acquisition today takes 
place via shifts in assets from the older generation to the younger 
generation.  Indeed, the intergenerational transfer of wealth is perhaps 
the most blatant example of the transfer of resources on a non-merit 
basis.70 
Groups that have less wealth to bestow upon their offspring yield a 
next generation with less wealth.  Why have blacks collectively had less 
wealth to transfer to subsequent generations?  Gordon Nembhard and 
Chiteji observe: 
For African Americans, enslavement restricted owning one’s self and 
any other property; racial land reform never took place as promised 
after the Civil War; during Jim Crow, Black-owned land was seized 
                                                          
 68. RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE WEALTH OF HISPANIC HOUSEHOLDS: 
1996 TO 2002, at 5 (2004). 
 69. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth 
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Hamilton, Family Connections and the Black-White Wealth Gap Among Middle Class Families, 30 
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 9, 12 (2002). 
 70. William Darity, Jr. & Melba J. Nicholson, Racial Wealth Inequality and the Black Family, 
in AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE: ECOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 78, 81–82 (Vonnie 
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violently and records destroyed; and up through the twentieth century 
Black land loss continued with urbanization, discriminatory public 
policy and credit policies, and the intestate status of many parcels.71 
Here is the critical intergenerational transmission mechanism that 
plays the powerful role in the sustenance of American racial disparity—
the intergenerational transmission of property and assets.  This is not the 
transmission of psychic trauma, but the transmission (or non-
transmission) of material resources.  Racial differences in the capacity to 
shift these resources from old to young are directly—scientifically—
linked to the history of slavery and the failure to provide ex-slaves with 
forty acres and a mule.  Indeed, it is the latter failure that Horowitz 
himself describes as a “betrayal.” 
In 1972, Ivan Light argued that the presence of entrepreneurship and 
self-employment was depressed among black Americans because black 
communities were too individualistic, lacking in the ethnic networks and 
solidarity that led to business success in other communities.72  Writing 
with Gold in 2000, Light had moderated his position somewhat, but the 
underlying theme of black cultural deficiency was still present: 
Groups experience resource disadvantage when, as a result of some 
historical experience, such as centuries of slavery or peonage, their 
members enter the labor market with fewer resources than other groups.  
African Americans are in this position, as are Mexican immigrants.  
Resources include all attributes that improve the productivity of 
employees, including human capital, a positive work ethic, good diets, 
reliable health, contact networks, self-confidence, education, and so 
forth.73 
Thus, in this variant of cultural determinism, black businesses are 
underrepresented because blacks lack the behavioral attributes that would 
promote entrepreneurial success. 
Bogan and Darity undertook an analysis of patterns of self-
employment across an array of ethnic/racial groups across a century in 
the United States using IPUMS data.74  Their project demonstrates that 
after controlling for resources like income and education, ethnic/racial 
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groups with high levels of self-employment typically have high 
proportions of recent immigrants.  Immigrants are far more likely to be 
self-employed than non-immigrants.  Moreover, comparisons between 
non-immigrant blacks and Asians reveal similar “low” levels of self-
employment, and comparisons between immigrant blacks and Asians 
reveal similar “high” levels of self-employment.  Again, context appears 
to trump culture. 
 The final topic to be treated here is the burden of acting white, where 
context will prove decisive once again.  A wildly popular explanation for 
the racial achievement gap—it made its way routinely into Barack 
Obama’s stump speeches—is the idea that black students engage in 
academic self-sabotage because they fear that school success will lead 
their black peers to charge them with “acting white.”  High academic 
achievement will be met with being labeled a race traitor.  Hence, 
culturally based opposition toward doing well in school lies at the root of 
black students’ comparatively poor school performance.75 
 When Tyson, Darity, and Castellino undertook a comparative 
ethnographic study of the phenomenon in North Carolina schools, they 
found little evidence of this form of racialized harassment by black 
students toward other black students.76  They did find forms of 
harassment of “good” students, regardless of race, that were 
commonplace, particularly if the “good” students displayed an air of 
superiority toward their fellows.77  These types of harassment in part 
took the form of labeling the “good” students “geeks,” “nerds,” or 
“braniacs.”78 
 On the few occasions where high achieving black students were 
called “Oreos,” it was most likely to take place in schools where black 
students were grossly underrepresented in the most challenging classes.79  
This might be a high school that was forty to sixty percent black where 
only one or two black students could be found taking the Advanced 
Placement (AP) or Honors level classes.  Resentment from black peers 
would be magnified if those one or two black students signaled that they 
felt they were “special,” or “better” than the others.80  In fact, in this 
setting, the AP or Honors classes literally look like the propertied domain 
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of white students.81  Thus, it is the school context produced by policies of 
racialized tracking that creates the burden of acting white rather than the 
burden arising as a cultural import from a generally held opposition to 
academic achievement across the black community or even among black 
youth alone. 
The stratification economist would not have bothered to explain a 
racial achievement gap on the basis of cultural dysfunctionality.  He or 
she would start instead with the most basic question: Are the two groups 
of students receiving the same curricular content?  Are both groups of 
students being tested on material they have been taught?  Even if 
assessment is equal, was educational quality equal?  The context based 
explanation for the occurrence of a burden of acting white clearly 
indicates that the answer to these questions is “no.” 
                                                          
 81. See id. at 594 (noting one counselor’s story of her daughter often being the “only black in 
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